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Intervention: what are 
the domestic consequences? 
M S Mohanty and Philip Turner
1 
Introduction 
The conventional wisdom is that central banks can intervene in foreign exchange markets to resist 
currency appreciation for some time because there is no simple, clear ceiling to the volume of 
domestic currency they can sell in forex markets. Equally conventional is the view that prolonged, 
large-scale intervention must eventually weaken domestic macroeconomic performance - whether 
because of higher inflation, the costs of misaligned exchange rates or distortions in the financial 
system or the exchange rate/maturity exposures built up by the public sector. Yet massive intervention 
during the five years 2000 to 2004 by the major emerging market central banks - especially Asian 
central banks - has not apparently had such negative effects. Indeed, inflation has been low, financial 
systems appear stronger and there has been sustained growth. What has happened? This paper 
seeks to answer this question. 
The main reason for policy dilemma is that intervention in the foreign exchange market has direct 
implications for the stance of monetary policy. In some circumstances, the central bank may want both 
to resist currency appreciation and to ease monetary policy. If so, intervention would create no conflict 
with monetary policies. If not, the central bank would have to ensure that money market rates are held 
constant in the face of intervention; some would express this alternatively in terms of holding the 
monetary base broadly unchanged. This is the process of sterilisation.
2 
When intervention in the foreign exchange market (and the corresponding operations in money 
markets) are small, or where net positions tend to reverse quickly, preserving the stance of monetary 
policy through sterilisation operations will be comparatively easy. But as interventions become larger, 
or go on for longer in one direction, the conflict between monetary and exchange rate objectives 
becomes progressively harder to resolve. Financial markets come more and more to suspect that 
official targets for interest rates and for exchange rates are inconsistent - and that, sooner or later, one 
of these objectives must give. Difficulties are: (a) distortions may be created in the financial sector; and 
(b) heavy financing costs may be incurred by the authorities. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 1 discusses the recent experience of 
intervention, highlighting in particular the main differences between the current episode and two earlier 
periods of heavy intervention by emerging market central banks (1990-93 and 1995-96). Section 2 
explores the implications for monetary policy. Section 3 examines the consequences and costs of 
prolonged intervention. While Section 4 deals with the choice of instruments, Section 5 concludes. 
                                                       
1  The paper is based on the information provided by the central banks. We are thankful to David Archer, Piti Disyatat, 
Ramon Moreno, Toshitaka Sekine and Goetz von Peter for very useful comments; to Michela Scatigna, Gert Schnabel and 
Marjorie Santos for statistical help; and to Clare Batts and Monica Mauron for excellent secretarial assistance. 
2  The Jurgensen report (1983) provides a formal definition: “sterilized intervention (on the basis of a broader definition) means 
a change in the monetary authorities’ net foreign currency assets which is offset by a corresponding change in their net 
domestic assets, so that their monetary liabilities (or, specifically, the monetary base) remain unchanged. If, on the other 
hand, the change in the authorities’ net foreign assets is accompanied by a corresponding change in their monetary 
liabilities (so that, for instance, a reduction in foreign currency reserves would result in a reduction in the monetary base), 
the intervention is said to be unsterilized”. The operation generally involves a two-step process. In the first step, the 
monetary authority buys foreign currency assets by crediting cash to commercial banks’ accounts. This increases bank 
reserves beyond the normal settlement cash and compulsory reserve requirement, if any, that banks are required to keep 
with the central bank, temporarily raising the monetary base. In the second stage, the central bank sells domestic assets 
(assumed to be government bonds) from its portfolio through an open market operation, and banks use their excess deposit 
to settle securities purchases from the central bank. This restores bank reserves and monetary base to the original 
equilibrium, preventing an unwarranted easing of monetary policy. This is sterilised intervention, the net effect of which is a 
change in the composition of domestic and foreign currency assets with the public. BIS Papers No 24  57
 
1. Recent  experience 
Nature of foreign inflows 
The accumulation of reserves for emerging markets as a whole over the period 2000-04 has generally 
reflected current account surpluses, rather than heavy capital inflows. This is the opposite of the 
pattern seen in the 1990s - when the aggregate current account balance for the emerging world as a 
whole was negative and capital inflows large. Table 1 provides the aggregate regional magnitudes, 
while the country detail is given in Table A1 in the Annex. Most of the smaller East Asian economies 
actually had net capital outflows during 2000-04. Major oil-exporting countries (Algeria, Venezuela and 
Russia) have generated large surpluses. Nevertheless, capital inflows have been large in China,
3 India 
and Korea. Although net capital inflows to Latin America as a whole remains far below the level seen 
during the early 1990s episodes, they have played a substantial role in Brazil and Mexico during the 
past four years. In central Europe, heavy capital inflows exceeded current account deficits. 
Faced with these inflows, one response of countries may be to intervene to prevent the exchange rate 
from appreciating. Such a choice depends in part on the nature of the shock. For instance, a 
temporary inflow might require intervention whilst a more permanent change might demand currency 
appreciation. The response might also be different depending on whether pressure on the exchange 
rate is coming from the current account (which might respond in a stable and predictable way to 
currency appreciation) or from the capital account (perhaps less easily amenable to the exchange 
rate?). There are of course many other dimensions of possible shocks. 
How far the recent inflows are more permanent than the inflows seen in the early 1990s is difficult to 
judge. Current account positions tend to be less volatile than capital balances, although the present 
surpluses of some oil-exporting countries are temporary. Capital inflows in the 1990s were often driven 
by high nominal interest rates on local debt securities - and were therefore inherently volatile. More 
recent inflows (eg FDI) have perhaps been more permanent - or at least more stable. 
 
Table 1 
Capital flows, current accounts and intervention
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  Net capital flows  Current account 
balance 
























2      46   119  350    28   –18   354    18    47   649 
Asia, other
3   81   70  –206    –32    –40    285   75    16   88 
Latin America
4   128   100  77   –86   –64   –67    57    –10    44 
Central Europe
5    –3   23 85    –6   –13   –74  9   11    24 
Developing countries, total 326  332 238    –170    –165 513 164  59  922 
1  In billions of US dollars.   
2  Sum for China, India, Korea and Taiwan (China).   
3  Sum for Hong Kong SAR, Indonesia, 
Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand.     
4    Sum for Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru and 
Venezuela.   
5  Sum for the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland.   
6  Up to September 2004. 
Sources: IMF, Balance of Payments Statistics. 
   
 
                                                       
3  Ma and McCauley (2004) provide several reasons for the recent increase in non-FDI inflows into China. A steady fall in the 
differential between the onshore dollar deposit rate and the renminbi deposit rate to negative levels since 2001 has led 
Chinese residents to reduce their long dollar positions in favour of renminbi deposits and firms to increase their foreign 
currency borrowing. Such a trend may have been further reinforced by the expectation of a future revaluation of the fixed 
exchange rate, increasing the profitability of long renminbi/short dollar positions. One indicator of the rise in short-term 
inflows into China has been the reversal of errors and omissions in the balance of payments from annual average outflows 
of about $14 billion since 1995 to 2001 to inflows of over $13 billion in 2002 and 2003; see Xie (2004). 58  BIS Papers No 24
 
Scale of intervention 
In the 1990s, the foreign exchange reserves of developing countries as a group were a small 
percentage of the volume of cash in the hands of the public. The monetary authorities in many 
countries therefore did not have to issue interest-yielding securities on a large scale to finance reserve 
accumulation. The financial implications of intervention were consequently limited. One simple 
indication of this is the movement in the difference between the local currency value of foreign 
reserves and currency held by the public, which rose from less than $30 billion in Asia at the end of 
1990 to over $780 billion at the end of 2004 and from $44 billion to $139 billion in Latin America. In 
particular, the gap increased sharply in China from –$38 billion to $227 billion during this period and in 
Korea from $5 billion to $169 billion. 
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 Sources: IMF; national data. 
The movement in this gap is also large in relation to some simple measures of the size of the financial 
system - such as M1, M2 or domestic credit as shown in Graph 1. For instance, this gap (foreign 
reserves minus currency with the public) to broad money reached over 25% of M2 in Asia at the end of 
June 2004 compared with 9% at the beginning of the 1990s. In some Asian countries such financing 
gaps are much higher (see Annex A2). In Latin America, reserves were a high proportion of monetary 
aggregates in the first half of the 1990s. Since then, however, reserves have grown less rapidly in 
relation to currency with the public, with the financing gap declining since the mid-1990s until about 
2002. 
Another way to look at the scale of intervention is to compare the excess of foreign reserves over 
currency to the outstanding stock of public sector debt securities (Graph 2). The ratio has risen sharply 
in many Asian economies, exceeding, for instance, 70 to 100% in China, Korea and Malaysia. The 
central bank financing gap has thus accounted for a very large part of the available stock of risk-free 
securities in the economy. Such ratios have also risen in Brazil, Chile and Mexico during the past two 
years or so. In central Europe, however, the volume of debt issuance has been much higher than 
reserve accumulation. BIS Papers No 24  59
 
Graph 2 
Foreign reserves in relation 
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 1   Calculated as the ratio of foreign reserves net of currency in circulation over outstanding public sector debt securities. 
 Sources: IMF; national data; BIS statistics. 
2. Coordination  with monetary policy 
A first challenge the monetary authority faces is to coordinate intervention with monetary policy. As 
discussed in the paper by Disyatat and Galati in this volume, sterilised intervention could be effective 
through the portfolio balance channel (by affecting the relative scarcity of imperfectly substitutable 
assets) or through the signalling channel (for instance, by influencing expectations of future exchange 
rate or other policies).
4 But the close coordination with monetary policy that sterilised intervention 
assumes may not be easy to achieve in practice. At least three major potential problems can be 
identified: 
(i)  Monetary policy and exchange rate objectives may be inconsistent. The monetary 
authorities will find it harder to prevent appreciation pressure while at the same time 
raising the interest rate. Israel’s experience during the mid-1990s demonstrated such a 
dilemma (Elkayam (2004)). The Bank of Israel’s attempts to keep the exchange rate within 
a narrow band while raising the interest rate to fight domestic inflation pressures attracted 
more capital inflows, pushing the exchange rate further towards the stronger side of the 
band. The central bank finally gave up its resistance to appreciation in favour of the 
inflation objective by considerably widening the stronger side of the exchange rate band in 
1997. 
(ii)  “Distraction risk”. Truman (2003) argues that the authorities might be tempted to postpone 
fundamental adjustments hoping that intervention will succeed. He shows that during the 
late 1970s intervention against a weak dollar was primarily used as a substitute for 
monetary tightening in the United States. But the delay in tightening monetary policy 
eventually led to a sharp rise in inflation and the need to raise interest rates to a very high 
level. The tighter monetary policy, in turn, led to one of the worst recessions in US postwar 
history. 
                                                       
4  In the limit, when uncovered interest rate parity (UIP) holds, sterilised intervention ceases to be an additional policy 
instrument: a lower exchange rate in the spot market means that the domestic interest rate must fall given investors’ 
expectations about future appreciation. 60  BIS Papers No 24
 
(iii)  Sending the wrong signal about monetary policy. Intervention to resist appreciation might 
confuse the market when the central bank is raising interest rates to fight inflationary 
pressure. There is a danger that exchange rate policy might dominate monetary policy.
5 
In view of these challenges, what can be done to achieve better coordination? 
One suggestion has been that intervention should be restricted to cases where it is consistent with the 
central bank’s inflation forecast. For instance, intervention to resist depreciation should be 
accompanied by the forecast that inflation would - if depreciation occurred - rise above the target 
during the targeting horizon. Conversely, the central bank would intervene to resist appreciation only 
when inflation is forecast to fall below the target. Holub (2004) argues that in the Czech Republic such 
coordination has been maintained since the introduction of inflation targeting in 1998: most interventions 
against currency appreciation were carried out when (a) inflation was expected to fall below the target 
and (b) the output gap was negative. 
Similarly, the Reserve Bank of New Zealand has recently proposed to intervene only against 
excessive medium-term swings in the exchange rate, when those swings cannot be explained by 
fundamentals. The criteria for interventions also require that they be consistent with the inflation 
objective. Interventions to limit exchange rate variations would, if necessary, be offset by greater 
interest rate variations to maintain monetary conditions appropriate for achieving the inflation target.
6 
Thus decision-making with respect to intervention is obliged to pay attention to the coordination issue, 
and in this monetary policy objectives are paramount. Archer (2004) provides a rationale for 
intervention under such criteria. In a small open economy, the exchange rate might play a dominant 
role in the monetary transmission mechanism from policy rates to output and inflation.
7 Intervention 
would seek to temper further appreciation pressures at the peak of the exchange rate cycle in order to 
simulate activity in the tradable sector, while monetary policy would move into a tighter mode to restrict 
further expansion in the non-tradable sector. Similarly, moving towards the trough of the exchange 
rate cycle, intervention would restrict further expansion in the tradable sector but stimulate the 
domestic economy through a lower interest rate. 
Limits to sterilised intervention 
A second question concerns the ability of monetary authorities to conduct sterilised intervention on a 
sustained basis. What are the limits to sterilised intervention? At least three major impediments have 
been discussed in the literature. This section outlines such impediments in general terms and 
subsequent sections consider their practical importance in the current situation: 
1.  The impossible trinity - the central bank cannot indefinitely control both the nominal 
exchange rate and the money market rate. This is the classic argument of Mundell (1968). In 
the case of intervention to prevent depreciation, such a limit will be often set by the reserves 
and contingency credit lines available to a country. Depleting reserves, at some stage, will 
make an interest rate increase inevitable. The limit on intervention to prevent appreciation is, 
however, less clear cut because reserves can keep rising. It could be argued, however, that 
resisting currency appreciation would prevent the domestic money market interest rate from 
falling, attract more inflows and thus continuously increase the need for sterilisation. 
Eventually, the cost of sterilisation would rise to high levels, leading either the interest rate to 
fall or the exchange rate to appreciate.
8 In the long run, therefore, appreciation becomes 
                                                       
5  See Truman (2003), who cites the remarks by Gerald Corrigan expressing concern about a conflict of objectives in the 
United States during the 1989-90 intervention episode when the government was trying to weaken the dollar while the 
Federal Reserve was tightening monetary policy. 
6  The Reserve Bank has also proposed another precondition, that intervention should be expected to have an effect on the 
exchange rate (see the paper by Eckhold and Hunt in this volume). 
7  In New Zealand’s case a relatively high interest rate differential has been associated with strong capital inflows, rapid 
appreciation of the exchange rate and large declines in tradable good prices. Archer (2004) argues that in such 
circumstances a combination of intervention and policy rate adjustment would help to achieve a balanced income growth in 
the tradable and non-tradable sector, to the extent that interventions were successful. 
8  Mundell (1968) shows that sterilisation policy is inconsistent because it prevents the money supply and nominal income 
from rising to restore equilibrium in the goods and asset markets. The constraint, according to him, is that “if the central 
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unavoidable because even in the former case the resulting increase in money supply and 
inflation will lead to an appreciation of the real exchange rate.
9 
In the previous episodes, large-scale sterilised intervention had indeed led to sharp 
increases in short-term interest rates - particularly in countries with a history of inflation. 
Reinhart and Reinhart (1999) document evidences during the early 1990s.
10 In Chile the 
short-term interest rate (30- to 89-day bank lending rate) rose from about 28% in the period 
(1988-89) preceding capital inflows to over 46% during the period (January to July 1990) of 
heavy inflows and sterilisation. The rise in interest rates was as dramatic in Colombia, with 
prime lending rates of banks more than doubling from 22% during the pre-inflow period 
(1989-90) to over 47% during the peak of sterilisation (January to November 1991).
11 Such 
rate increases were also pronounced in Korea, Malaysia and Indonesia. Reinhart and 
Reinhart (1999) conclude that “sterilization policies were either abandoned or scaled back or 
complemented by capital controls, as it became evident that the high domestic interest rates 
were attracting more inflows”. 
Note, however, that in low-inflation countries (where the running costs of holding reserves is 
low or even negative) that appreciation pressures can, at least from the perspective of this 
argument, be resisted for a considerable period of time. 
2.  Imperfect substitutability among assets means that changes in the supplies of such assets 
as a result of sterilisation affects relative prices. Classic models (eg Argy and Murray (1985) 
and Argy (1994)) typically assume that the central bank sells domestic bonds to sterilise. If 
domestic bonds (whose yield carries a risk premium) are imperfect substitutes of foreign 
bonds, the authorities would have to pay higher interest rates on their sterilisation bonds to 
encourage bondholders to switch out of foreign bonds.
12 Moreover, such impacts may be 
heightened in the face of several other imperfections in local markets.
13 Examples include: 
illiquid bond markets; lack of sufficient substitutability between domestic assets in investors’ 
portfolio; and the concentration of capital inflows on only certain financial market segments 
(see Turner (1991), Frankel (1993) and World Bank (1997)). For instance, capital inflows 
may be concentrated in equity markets while central banks sell their own paper to sterilise 
such inflows. If asset holdings of the non-financial private sector were perfectly substitutable, 
it would be expected to sell equity and willingly buy additional claims on the central bank, 
increasing the assets demanded by foreigners. In the absence of such an adjustment, the 
interest rate on central bank securities may rise substantially to restore the portfolio 
equilibrium. 
                                                                                                                                                                       
bank sells securities at the same rate as it is buying reserves it cannot buy reserves at a rate fast enough to keep the 
exchange rate from appreciating. And if the central bank buys reserves at a rate fast enough to stabilise the exchange rate, 
it can not sell securities fast enough to keep the money supply constant” (p 255). 
9  Frankel (1993) extends this model to study the impact under different types of shocks. The main argument is that 
sterilisation is difficult when the cause of the capital inflows is a rise in investors’ confidence in the economy, raising their 
demand for monetary assets. Attempts to sterilise capital inflows to maintain a constant money supply in such cases would 
raise interest rates, leading to larger inflows. On the other hand, when the source of capital inflows is an external shock such 
as a decline in the foreign interest rate, sterilised intervention can be a viable option in the short run. While capital inflows 
will continue to respond to positive interest rate differentials, the problem will be contained by the fact that such a shock 
leaves the level of the domestic interest rate unaltered. 
10  Nevertheless, such increases need also to be viewed in the context of the overall macroeconomy. To the extent that some 
countries witnessed overheating pressures, higher interest rates may have reflected the stance of monetary policy rather 
than sterilisation alone. Separating the two effects is difficult in the absence of proper econometric controls. 
11  See Griffith-Jones et al (2001) and Reinhart and Dunaway (1996) for a description of several similar episodes of sterilised 
intervention during the early 1990s. 
12  However, if nothing else changes, higher domestic bond rates might encourage a switch out of money and into bonds, 
leading to a subsequent fall in the interest rate. 
13  In principle, the theoretical limit for sterilised intervention may be higher in emerging market economies than in the industrial 
economies. Such a finding is supported by empirical estimates of offset coefficients, which tend to be lower in the former 
than the latter group of countries; see, for example, Kouri and Porter (1974) and Fry (1993). With their greater integration 
with international financial markets in recent years the offset coefficients may have increased in a number of emerging 
market economies, reducing the scope of sterilisation. Moreover, the practical limits to sterilisation may be much lower in 
emerging market economies because investors may demand a large risk premium on their domestic assets, given the 
higher probability of default and illiquid markets for such debts. 62  BIS Papers No 24
 
A general point that several participants in the meeting stressed is that the demand for 
domestic assets is affected by the nature of the forex inflow that gives rise to the forex 
intervention. Where financial markets are thin (or the scale of intervention very large), 
differences between the assets supplied by the central bank in sterilisation and the assets 
demanded (eg by non-residents in the case of a capital inflow) can affect relative asset 
prices. 
3.  The high costs of issuing high-yield local currency debt to acquire low-yielding reserves can 
exacerbate fiscal deficits and so threaten macroeconomic stability. This can be particularly 
serious in countries that already have large public sector debts. In some circumstances, the 
combination of high costs and increasing reserves may provide a signal to markets that 
policy is on an unsustainable path and so accentuate destabilising capital flows. 
Calvo (1991) argued that such effects would eventually weaken central banks’ anti-inflation 
credibility by raising the spectre of debt monetisation and high inflation. Comparing the high 
interest rate differentials of Chile and Colombia with Argentina, which followed a policy of 
non-sterilised intervention during the early 1990s, Calvo et al (1993) cast serious doubts on 
the desirability of sterilised intervention because it raised debt service costs at a time when 
countries were attempting to bring domestic debt expansion under control. Similarly, Velasco 
and Cabezas (1999) attribute much of the origins of the 1994 Mexican crisis to the large 
stock of short-term Cetes and Tesobonos issued by the government for sterilising capital 
inflows. They argue that “the presence of a large stock of non-indexed debts kept alive in 
investors the fear that the Mexican government would eventually return to a high-inflation 
policy to reduce the value of outstanding liabilities”. 
The actual significance of these impediments can be minimised by a careful selection of 
instruments of sterilisation or switching to non-market instruments. Their use and 
implications are discussed in Section 4 of this paper. 
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3.  Three possible consequences of prolonged sterilised intervention 
The sterilisation of prolonged or very large intervention could eventually have three consequences: it 
could undermine monetary objectives; it could compromise financial stability; and it could impose 
heavy financing costs on the monetary authorities. This section examines how far the current situation 
raises such risks. 
Focusing on the first issue, the nature of monetary challenges in the current cycle has varied from the 
previous experience. In the past, inflation risks often meant the authorities were unwilling to 
countenance the lower short-term interest rates that intervention entailed. In the more recent episode, 
by contrast, many countries accumulating reserves actually wanted an easier monetary policy stance. 
Low inflation and large output gaps especially following the 2001 global economic slowdown had led 
many Asian central banks to cut interest rates to stimulate domestic demand. As a result, short-term 
interest rates have fallen or remained low throughout Asia during the past four years (Graph 3). The 
picture appears to be broadly similar in a number of countries in central Europe and Latin America. 
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1  Ten year treasury bond yields. 
Source: National data. 
An additional factor is that some countries, at least at the beginning of the current cycle, have seen 
greater risk aversion among banks, increasing their demand for safer assets and thus putting 
downward pressures on long-term bond rates. In India, for example, such a flight-to-quality behaviour 
has meant that banks have been more than willing to invest in government securities (or indeed other 
sterilisation instruments) at a low interest rate. By the middle of October 2004 banks held more than 
39% of their total liabilities in government bonds, far exceeding the minimum statutory liquidity 
requirement of 25%. Such effects remain significant in several other economies in Asia (for example, 
Korea) and Latin America. 64  BIS Papers No 24
 
Third, domestic bond markets have grown larger and deeper in emerging market economies, further 
facilitating large-scale open market operations in many countries. While domestic bond markets were 
small during the early 1990s, they have grown in relation to GDP during the past few years. In Asia, for 
example, outstanding domestic government and central bank securities rose from less than 14% of 
GDP at the end of 2000 to 23% at the end of 2003. In Latin America and central Europe such ratios 
stood at 24% and 32%, respectively, at the end of 2004. This may have helped to alleviate some of 
the financial market imperfections which had constrained central banks’ ability to sustain sterilised 
intervention in the past. 
(a)  Risk of monetary imbalance 
Nevertheless, the combination of low interest rates and (in some cases) large effective depreciation of 
the exchange rate has meant that monetary conditions have been very expansionary in a very large 
number of countries in the current cycle (Graph 5). Most countries are in the third quadrant - policy 
rates were lowered and the currency depreciated in nominal effective terms. 
Such a policy mix has several risks. At some point, the risk of inflation rises - even if globally inflation 
has been low in recent years. In China, the risk of overheating has remained a major concern during 
the past two years. The annual inflation rate steadily increased from a little over 1% at the end of 2003 
to over 5% by the middle of 2004, before declining at the end of the year due to a sharp deceleration 
in food prices. Russia faced a similar situation last year as reserve accumulation to prevent 
appreciation of the rouble fuelled monetary growth and contributed to higher inflation in the economy. 
In India, a sharp increase in inflation over the past year (from 6% to 8% since July 2004) has brought a 
similar challenge into the picture. Many East Asian economies (Korea, Singapore and Thailand) have 































































































 1   Cumulative changes for the period 2000-04. 
 Source:  National  data. 
Second, another potential risk could arise from the large-scale issuance of debt securities by central 
banks. In Korea, outstanding monetary stabilisation bonds, issued primarily for sterilisation operation 
by the central bank, more than doubled between 2000 and 2004 to constitute 300% of reserve money 
(see Annex Table A3). Such ratios have increased to over 200% in the Czech Republic, 150% in Israel 
and 50% in Malaysia and Mexico. In China, from their introduction in April 2003 outstanding central 
bank securities grew to 14% of the reserve money at the end September 2004. In the current BIS Papers No 24  65
 
monetary accounting convention, central bank securities are excluded from both base money and the 
broader monetary aggregates. As such, their monetary impacts remain hidden. Nevertheless, they 
represent potential liquidity in the commercial banks’ balance sheets - which the banks could use for 
supporting future lending operations. Moreover, interest payments on such securities will continue to 
fuel bank reserves, adding to the challenges for central banks’ monetary management. In Korea 
recently, for instance, interest payments on monetary stabilisation bonds are reported to have 
matched their net issuance.
14 
Third, sterilisation securities in many countries tend to be shorter-term bills rather than longer-term 
bonds (Table 2). For instance, a large part of central bank securities in 2004 were concentrated in 
maturities of less than one year. In the Czech Republic, Israel, Malaysia, Peru and Thailand, 
sterilisation securities are primarily less than one year while in Korea they stretch out up to two years. 
Only a few countries, such as Chile, issue securities which go beyond three to five years. Short-term 
sterilisation debts expose the central bank and the government to rollover risks. Not only do they 
necessitate future liquidity-draining operations, but they would also raise future costs should domestic 
interest rates rise. 
 
Table 2 
Maturity distribution of central bank securities
1 
  Less than 
six months  
Six months 
to one year 




  2000  2004 2000 2004 2000 2004 2000 2004 
Asia
2,3   15.7    13.2    27.8    20.8   43.6    36.1    12.9   30.3 
   Hong Kong SAR    42.7    28.1    24.6   27.8   11.0   11.9   21.7   32.2 
   Korea    0.0    4.8    39.9   16.7   59.8    65.8    0.3   12.7 
   Philippines    0.0    0.0    0.0  5.9   52.1   0.0    47.9    94.1 
   Malaysia     73.5    50.5    26.5   51.6  0.0   0.0    0.0   0.0 
   Thailand      0.0    100.0      0.0      0.0 
Latin America
2,4   6.1    3.9    2.7    13.5   81.0  35.6    10.0    46.7 
   Brazil    0.0    0.0    1.9   0.0   89.0   15.9    9.1    84.1 
   Chile    22.3    13.8    11.4   1.2  4.9   26.7    61.3    58.3 
   Mexico     0.0    0.0    0.0   30.3  100.6   69.2    0.0   0.0 
   Peru    78.6    50.8    14.3   44.3    0.0   3.3    0.0    0.0 
   Venezuela    100.0      0.0      0.0      0.0 
Central Europe
2    56.3    29.4    22.8    22.8  0.0   0.0  20.9    47.7 
   Czech Republic    0.0    0.0  100.0   100.0  0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0 
   Hungary    100.0    0.0    0.0  0.0  0.0   0.0    0.0  100.0 
   Poland    63.8    50.9    0.0   0.0  0.0   0.0    36.2    49.1 
Israel      25.7     74.3     0.0     0.0 
South Africa   100.0    100.0    0.0   0.0  0.0   0.0    0.0   0.0 
1  As a percentage of total central bank securities outstanding; end of year. For 2004,data pertains to various months as 
reported by the central banks up to November 2004.     
2    Average of the economies shown.     
3  Excluding 
Thailand.   
4  Excluding Venezuela. 
Source: National data. 
                                                       
14  In countries which use government bonds rather than central bank securities for sterilisation operations, large sterilisation 
operations create debt servicing obligations that impact government budgets. In the absence of offsetting fiscal adjustments, 
such payments have potential expansionary implications by raising government spending and the fiscal deficit. 66  BIS Papers No 24
 
(b)  Risks to the financial sector 
Interventions could also accentuate financial imbalances. One possible channel is that increased bank 
lending resulting from ineffective sterilisation could finance excessive investment in certain sectors 
such as equity and property markets. And a large overhang of excess liquidity might make banks too 
willing to accommodate demand for such credit. Moreover, banks which have accumulated large 
amounts of risk-free assets may be keen to invest in riskier assets that promise higher returns. Some 
have argued that reserve accumulation sends a signal that central banks have ample foreign 
exchange assets to support local banks should the need arise. This may, in effect, reduce the 
probability of future default and thus relax financing constraints on firms. The possible public provision 
of international liquidity may lead firms to become more relaxed in their assessment of risk and 
respond by increasing foreign currency borrowing to finance riskier investments even in non-tradable 
sectors (see Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2000)).
15 
Are there signs of any such risks at present? This is difficult to assess. One important trend in many 
countries is that banks have sharply raised their lending to households to finance consumption and 
housing investment. In many Asian economies mortgage and housing credit has been rising by 15 to 30% 
a year during the past two years (Table 3).
16 In some countries such a development has been 
associated with strong increases in property prices. Korea has already seen a boom-and-bust credit 
cycle last year. Rapid growth in consumer credit in 2001 and 2002 sharply raised default rates, 
creating financial distress for a number of credit card companies. The economy has slowed 
considerably since 2003 as households reduced consumption and banks cut lending. Thailand 
avoided a similar situation early this year with authorities tightening lending norms for consumer and 
property market lending. In China, a sharp acceleration of lending to the residential and commercial 
housing sectors in the past two years was followed by the imposition of regulatory restrictions on bank 
lending. Many Latin American and central European countries have also seen faster growth in 
household lending in recent years. 
A second possible channel is through the impact on investors’ exchange rate expectations. 
Expectations of future appreciation, for instance, can attract larger capital inflows, pushing equity and 
bond prices too high. The economy is left more vulnerable to a subsequent reversal of inflows and a 
collapse of the exchange rate and other asset prices. There is at present no decisive evidence that a 
substantial rise in short-term inflows has created major vulnerabilities in the current cycle. There is, 
nevertheless, some evidence that their role may have remained significant in several recent episodes. 
For instance, a sharp increase in equity inflows to several Asian economies during the past two years 
was seen by many as investors’ reaction to profit opportunities arising from expected currency 
appreciation. Another indicator of such expectations was the large negative long-term interest rate 
differential seen by many Asian economies during the periods of peak inflows and sterilised 
interventions (BIS (2004)). Last year India saw a rise in unhedged corporate borrowing, leading to the 
introduction of a regulatory requirement for firms to hedge their foreign currency exposures. The 
recent sharp increase in short-term inflows (and perhaps transfers) to China has been associated with 
the expectation of a possible future revaluation of the fixed exchange rate. 
 
                                                       
15  Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2000) show that the basic mechanism through which this happens is financial market 
deficiencies rather than moral hazard risk. When domestic bond markets are illiquid, issuance of sterilisation debt leads to a 
liquidity mismatch in the central bank’s balance sheet. Since the central bank cannot redeem these securities easily and 
commits to supply reserves in the event of a crisis, it has, in effect, given support to domestic asset prices, effectively 
lowering the cost of capital for firms. 
16  It is important to recognise that a relatively faster rate of increase in household credit has played a major role in recovery in 
domestic demand in Asia following the 1997-98 financial crisis. Such a development may also reflect stronger demand for 
credit led by recent liberalisation of restrictions on banks to lend to households and relatively weak credit demand from 
business sector. As such, not all credit expansion to households is undesirable. BIS Papers No 24  67
 
Table 3 
Household credit and residential property prices
1 
Mortgage credit




2002 2003 2004 2002 2003 2004 2002 2003 2004 
Asia
3    3.9   18.7   15.8   13.6   22.3    19.9   2.1   7.4   8.7 
   Hong Kong SAR    0.8    –2.1    –2.0   –2.4   –1.8    1.4  –11.8   –1.1   27.0 
   Indonesia    –0.6  31.6  23.3    24.2   33.6   27.6   7.6   11.0   6.2 
   Philippines    –0.0    –3.0      20.2   3.9     0.8   0.8   
   Singapore    6.8    16.3    14.9    –0.8   17.0 2.9    –1.8   –2.0   –0.8 
      Thailand   11.0   16.5   14.1   20.3   19.1 19.3    7.6   18.5   16.7 
   Taiwan, China    4.5    10.2    13.4   1.4   19.4 20.3   –4.6   –2.3    0.4 
Latin America
4  –14.1   –8.6   –7.3   –1.0   12.9 23.9       
   Argentina   –52.3  –19.0  –15.6 –60.1 –14.1 21.7       
   Brazil  –10.6    –4.8    –3.7   –6.1   5.5 16.1       
   Chile    4.4    9.4    1.3   8.8   10.3 20.5       
   Colombia  –10.4  –11.7  –12.8   –0.7   16.4 20.4  –13.9   8.4   4.3 
   Mexico  –11.4  –15.4  –11.3   28.0   34.5  39.4   –2.6   –1.5   
   Peru    11.3    10.6   10.7   9.8   13.4 10.8       
Central Europe
4   83.6   66.3   61.8   55.4   16.4 12.1       
   Czech Republic    44.7    52.7   56.3   86.9   16.5  9.5       
   Hungary  129.6    82.5    68.3    18.2   16.3  15.2     15.3   10.0 
Russia   78.4       28.6       22.5   18.8   
South  Africa   –2.3   12.8   14.4   –1.7   7.6 7.4    17.0   19.4   25.1 
1  Annual changes, in per cent; end of year. For 2004, up to second quarter. Definitions of the series may vary across 
countries.   
2  In real terms. Deflated by consumer price inflation.   
3  Average of economies shown excluding the Philippines. 
4  Average of countries shown. 
(c)  Cost of intervention 
An earlier presumption has been that intervention entails large running costs because emerging 
market countries’ assets typically have higher yields than those of industrial countries. And such costs 
have indeed been very high in the past. In Chile, for example, the annual loss to the central bank from 
foreign exchange market intervention was estimated to have risen to about 0.5% of GDP during 1990 
to 1993 (Velasco and Cabezas (1999)). The policy of resisting appreciation was ultimately abandoned. 
During the current episode, by contrast, low domestic interest rates have reduced the carrying costs of 
reserves in many countries. Table 4 presents illustrative estimates of carrying costs obtained by 
applying the difference between the interest rate on one-year domestic treasury bonds (or central bank 
bills) and that for a comparable US Treasury security to annual changes in the domestic currency 
value of reserves.
17 The table also reports, where available from central bank sources, the net 
revaluation effect, which is the difference between the revaluation losses or gains from foreign 
currency assets and that on foreign currency liabilities in the central bank portfolio. 
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Over the period 2000-03 as a whole, carrying costs appear to have been below 0.5% of GDP in most 
countries. With the domestic bond rate at or below the US Treasury rate, some countries (for instance 
China and Singapore) have even seen net gains rather than losses in accumulating reserves in some 
years. In some others (for instance Hungary and South Africa), negative carrying costs in some years 
reflect a decline in reserve levels rather than negative interest rate differentials. In Brazil and Turkey, 
given their high interest rate differentials, carrying costs have been relatively high, although they fell 
sharply in the latter in 2003. 
Table 4 
Intervention: estimates of the carrying costs 
and valuation effects of changes in reserves 
 Carrying  cost
1 Net  valuation  effect
2 
  2000 2001 2002 2003 2000 2001 2002 2003 
A s i a           
   China   –0.04   –0.05    0.00    0.06         
   Hong Kong SAR    0.02    0.01    0.00   0.01   –0.87   –1.03   2.18   1.88 
   India    0.05    0.09    0.19    0.17         
   Indonesia    0.42    0.42    0.10   0.10   –0.21  0.00   –0.00   0.00 
   Korea    0.06    0.07    0.09    0.14         
   Malaysia    0.03   –0.01    0.04    0.16         
   Philippines    0.10    0.25   –0.00   0.08   0.00   0.00   0.00   0.00 
   Singapore   –0.16    0.03   –0.04   –0.03         
Latin  America          
   Brazil   –0.04    0.38    0.43    0.74   –1.06   –0.84   2.19   –0.98 
   Chile   –0.02    0.01   –0.00   0.00   1.73   3.11   2.80    –3.64 
   Mexico    0.07    0.14    0.07   0.12    –0.00   0.00   –0.01   0.00 
Central  Europe          
   Czech Republic   –0.01    0.03    0.15   –0.01         
   Hungary    0.16   –0.06   –0.19   0.07   0.58   0.37    –0.02   0.48 
   Poland    0.19   –0.16    0.10    0.05         
Israel   0.01    0.02    0.16    0.06    –0.78   0.02   0.19   0.50 
New Zealand   –0.00   –0.00    0.01    0.03         
South Africa    0.01    0.06    0.08    –0.10      
Turkey  0.98 2.79 3.50 1.26 1.00   3.99   0.42   –0.20 
1  Calculated as the spread between the domestic and the US one-year treasury bill interest rate, applied to the change in 
foreign exchange reserves in domestic currency, as a percentage of GDP, in the year shown.   
2  Difference between the 
exchange rate revaluation effects on assets and liabilities of the central bank, denominated in foreign currency. 
Sources: National data; BIS calculations. 
 
The cost calculations in Table 4 do not capture own-currency capital gains or losses, which remain a 
major additional element of the overall return from central banks’ assets. These have been much 
larger during the recent period. Increased prices on US dollar bonds may have boosted capital gains 
from foreign currency assets, adding to the return from such assets. A comparison of average returns 
from domestic and foreign assets brings out the importance of this factor (Mohanty and Scatigna (2005)). 
In Hong Kong and Israel, for instance, the negative return on domestic assets (over 12% and 51%, 
respectively) in 2002 was fully or partly offset by the positive return from foreign assets. In Korea and BIS Papers No 24  69
 
Chile, the average return on the central bank’s foreign currency assets exceeded that on domestic 
assets by a factor of 2 and 10 percentage points, respectively, during the same year. 
4.  Choice of instruments 
A specific aspect of sterilised intervention in the current cycle has been the challenge for monetary 
authorities in finding instruments to withdraw excess liquidity. Some central banks have had too few 
instruments (and so introduced new measures to drain liquidity), while others have increased issuance 
of their own securities. Such developments raise four issues. What factors determine the choice 
between market and non-market instruments? What market instruments should be used? What are 
the implications of issuing central bank securities as against government bonds for sterilisation 
operations? What role have other policies played in dealing with such pressures and how effective are 
they? 
Market vs non-market instruments 
Instruments that have a high degree of marketability, such as government and central bank paper, are 
generally more suitable than non-market instruments because they help central banks to withdraw 
liquidity without adversely affecting the depth of the financial markets and without distorting the 
capacity of financial institutions to intermediate credit. 
In the past, however, some central banks have found that the price response on market instruments in 
thin markets can be uncomfortably large - much larger than would be the case in deeper markets. 
When local bond rates rose sharply, for instance, there was greater recourse to non-market 
instruments for sterilisation operations. For example, during the early 1990s episode of capital inflows, 
many East Asian economies transferred large amounts of provident fund deposits from the banking 
system to the central bank at below market interest rates.
18 Malaysia and the Czech Republic sharply 
raised reserve requirements, and Indonesia imposed a 15% tax on interest payments by banks and 
introduced direct credit control measures.
19 The drawbacks of non-market instruments are well known. 
Reserve requirements effectively tax the banking system, and thus encourage financial 
disintermediation. Any attempt to pass on the cost to borrowers might encourage firms to borrow 
abroad, defeating the very purpose of sterilised intervention. The compulsory transfer of public 
institutions’ deposits - especially when not remunerated at the market rate - forces these institutions to 
bear a part of the sterilisation costs. 
As Table A4 in the Annex shows, during the current cycle most countries have used a number of 
market and non-market instruments - often in concert - for sterilising their foreign exchange market 
interventions. But it is striking that a preference for market instruments does seem to be becoming well 
established. Such a development may partly reflect the fact that interest rates remain low in most 
countries despite the large-scale open market operations, obviating any need for exceptional 
measures for exercising monetary control. 
Nevertheless, there have been notable differences across countries, particularly those witnessing a 
large growth in foreign currency reserves. Korea has largely relied on market instruments for 
sterilisation.
20 The two large Asian economies - China and India - have used a mix of market and 
non-market instruments. In China, open market operations in bonds have been important. But the 
People’s Bank of China also raised reserve requirements by 1 percentage point in September 2003 
and again by 1/2 percentage point in April 2004. In addition, the fact that the central bank remunerated 
the excess reserves of commercial banks induced the banks to willingly hold large amounts of cash 
                                                       
18  See Reisen (1993) and Griffith-Jones et al (2001) for a discussion on East Asian experience. 
19  See Nasution (2001) for an extensive discussion of the policy challenges confronted by Bank Indonesia in the early 1990s. 
20  In Korea, monetary stabilisation bonds issued by the central bank constitute the key instrument of sterilisation, although 
such an instrument was first introduced as a monetary policy instrument and not specifically as a sterilisation device. Such 
sterilisation effort was also helped by the fact that government intervened on its own account by issuing dollar-denominated 
liabilities, using its so-called foreign exchange stabilisation fund; see the paper by Rhee (in this volume). 70  BIS Papers No 24
 
balances with the central bank. These measures were supplemented by direct lending restrictions in 
early 2004 to contain credit growth to the overheated sectors. In India, although open market 
operations have been the principal instrument for sterilisation, the central bank also raised reserve 
requirements by 0.5 percentage points in September 2004 to control rapid growth in the money 
supply. The central bank has not ruled out using such an instrument solely for sterilisation purposes 
under exceptional circumstances. 
Which market instrument? 
The three major market instruments are long-term bonds, shorter-term instruments such as swaps and 
repos, and direct borrowing from banks at market interest rates. 
Central banks may face a trade-off in issuing longer-term vs shorter-term securities. It is well 
recognised that long-term bonds issued to non-banks are the most effective way of draining liquidity 
from the banking sector - and so constraining bank lending. Hence this is particularly useful during 
episodes of prolonged forex inflows/intervention. And the interest rate risk is transferred to the private 
non-bank sector. 
However, the investor base in many countries is narrow. As a result, sterilisation securities are mostly 
sold to banks. But by choosing to issue longer-maturity bonds central banks can reduce the rollover 
problem and exposure to interest rate risks associated with shorter-term bills. The consequences of 
higher or lower policy rates then fall squarely on the private sector - enhancing the efficacy of 
monetary policy. For example, in China the central bank has announced the issue of three-year 
securities beginning in 2005 with a view to lengthening the maturity of sterilisation bonds. To the 
extent that such bonds replace the shorter-term central bank bills, they could have a longer-term 
impact on the excess liquidity in the banking system, thereby enhancing monetary control. 
On the other hand, issuing long-term bonds could prove to be expensive - especially if the yield on 
such bonds incorporates a significant inflation risk. Moreover, in the case of temporary forex inflows, 
instruments such as repurchase operations and foreign exchange swaps might be preferred. They 
might also increase the flexibility of monetary operations. While central banks might run up 
intervention-related debts during an inflow cycle, they can run them down during periods of heavy 
outflows and depreciation pressures on the exchange rate. 
Singapore provides a good example of the use of swap and repo operations for sterilised intervention. 
Prior to 1998, the Monetary Authority of Singapore largely depended on foreign exchange swaps and 
uncollateralised deposit facilities for its liquidity operations. But with the volume of liquidity operations 
rising sharply and exposing the central bank to significant counterparty risk, it introduced repurchase 
operations on government paper. Given a highly developed swap market, the central bank uses 
foreign exchange swaps for longer-term withdrawal of liquidity but repurchase transactions for more 
short-term liquidity operations. With the economy witnessing very large capital inflows during 
September and October 2003, the central bank drained excess liquidity of around 8% of its liability 
base by using a combination of repos, swaps and deposit facilities; see Tee (2005). 
A final instrument, used extensively by many countries in this cycle, is direct borrowing by the central 
bank from commercial banks through an overnight deposit facility.
21 In Malaysia, direct borrowing by 
the central bank constitutes the single most important instrument for sterilising excess liquidity 
(accounting for over 69% of the monetary base). Another example of extensive use of such an 
instrument is Hungary.
22 The speculative attack on the forint on the strong edge of the band in January 
2004 resulted in very large capital inflows over a span of few days (about EUR 5 billion in two days). 
While intervening in the foreign exchange market the central bank absorbed most of the excess 
liquidity through the overnight and two-week deposit facility offered to banks. At the same time, the 
central bank sharply cut the interest rate on overnight deposits to reduce the profitability of 
speculators. The central bank in the Philippines uses its tiering deposit system (interest rates varying 
with the amount of the deposit) as an instrument for sterilising interventions. Similarly, the central bank 
                                                       
21  The treatment of such deposits, however, differs; some central banks have classified them as non-market instruments and 
some have not. 
22  See the paper by Érsek in this volume. BIS Papers No 24  71
 
of Mexico offers a special deposit facility to banks at market interest rates to withdraw long-term 
liquidity from the banking system. 
Government vs central bank securities 
From the perspective of the consolidated budget of the public sector, the distinction between 
government and central bank securities would seem unimportant - as both are official sector liabilities. 
Nevertheless, there may be reasons for preferring one form of issuance over another. In any event 
country approaches to the use of government or central bank paper for sterilisation have differed 
considerably. Three such approaches are discernible. First, a majority of central banks issue their own 
securities rather than depending on their governments to issue such paper (Annex Table A4).  
A second approach followed by some central banks (for instance New Zealand, the Philippines and 
Singapore) has been to depend exclusively on government issuance for sterilisation operations. A 
recent striking example is the Reserve Bank of India, which, despite facing a shortage of securities, 
preferred not to issue its own securities. Under a new monetary stabilisation scheme (MSS) introduced 
in April 2004, the central government started issuing additional securities, over and above its 
borrowing requirement, exclusively for sterilisation operations.
23 
A third approach has been to use both government and central bank paper. In Mexico, the market for 
both types of paper has grown simultaneously in the past few years. In Malaysia, the central bank has 
sparingly used its own securities for sterilisation operations - mostly for withdrawing longer-term 
liquidity - while the government issues its own bonds for financing deficits. Similar models are seen 
across a number of emerging market economies (eg the Czech Republic, Hungary and South Africa). 
There might be several reasons for relying on central bank paper. One is that central banks in 
countries where governments have historically run fiscal surpluses may lack a stock of government 
bonds for conducting even daily monetary policy operations. Chile and Hong Kong provide two such 
examples. Another explanation may be that central banks that are partly or fully responsible for 
managing the exchange rate might prefer to issue their own securities to finance intervention. 
A third reason is that governments may be unwilling to show sterilisation costs in their budgets for fear 
of raising the fiscal deficit and facing the prospects of substantial credit downgrades. These 
sterilisation costs can be large. If securities are issued in large volumes to cover intervention, the 
carrying cost of intervention can rise sharply as borrowing costs outstrip interest income on the foreign 
reserve assets accumulated in intervention. Locating those sterilisation costs in the central bank’s 
books might also be seen to have presentational advantages. 
For the central bank, however, not only would income substantially be reduced, but local currency 
interest rate risks could also rise. Duration mismatches increase as central banks issue shorter-term 
obligations to finance their longer-term foreign currency investment. Such a trend might also be 
reinforced by the authorities’ investment policy. For example, the attempt to minimise the net running 
cost of holding reserves may lead the monetary authorities to increase the benchmark duration of 
foreign currency assets but issue more short-term local securities. Such a strategy could lengthen the 
average duration of foreign currency assets while reducing that of their local currency debt securities. 
According to some limited (and unpublished) data available for a few central banks, the nature of the 
maturity mismatch problem differs across countries (Table 5). For instance, in the case of one central 
bank all outstanding securities were below one year, while it held about three quarters of its foreign 
currency assets in short-term maturities. In another case, the mismatch was the reverse. The central 
bank held about 70% of its foreign currency assets at less than one year to maturity by funding part of 
them through bonds of more than three-year maturity. It is possible, however, that duration 
mismatches are much higher than the data in Table 5 suggest - particularly for large reserve holders in 
Asia where such data are not available. 
                                                       
23  One technical limitation in the Reserve Bank’s case is that legislation does not permit it to issue its own liabilities. Such a 
legal constraint is related to the fact that under its Act, the RBI cannot borrow beyond its paid-up capital without collateral, 
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Whether the government or the central bank should bear the financing costs of reserve accumulation 
is debatable. Some have argued that what matters for confidence and monetary stability is the net 
worth of the combined government and central bank, which depends on the consolidated balance 
sheet of the public sector. If governments have to issue debt or borrow from the central bank to 
finance the sterilisation cost, its impacts will be similar to central bank recapitalisation. 
Table 5 
Maturity distribution of central 
banks’ assets and liabilities in 2004
1 





























CB1   40.4   39.1   20.5    0.0   0.0   0.0  15.9   84.1 
CB2   43.2   30.1   21.0    5.6         
CB3   53.8   10.3   25.6   10.3   50.8   44.3    3.3   0.0 
CB4   54.9   20.2   24.5    0.0   0.0  100.0   0.0    0.0 
CB5   35.0  36.0   21.0    8.0   0.0    0.0   0.0  100.0 
CB6    84.0   2.1   2.3    11.5         
CB7  88.5   4.8   5.8   1.0  100.0  0.0   0.0   0.0 
1    As a percentage of total gross foreign assets and central bank securities, respectively. In some cases the maturity 
assignment given in the replies to the questionnaires did not meet entirely the maturity classification as shown in the table. 
Source: National data. 
Others argue that preserving the operational autonomy of central banks and the soundness of their 
balance sheet remains a key condition for their operational effectiveness. Such an argument, for 
example, is demonstrated by the intervention strategy recently announced by the Reserve Bank of 
New Zealand; see RBNZ (2004). The Bank has asked the government to enhance its capital base to 
enable it to sustain possible short-term losses from intervention.
24 It has argued that such a strategy 
will ensure its operational independence from political process and other economic objectives that may 
be more short-term. 
Likewise, for good governance it would seem appropriate that interventions directed by the 
government should be borne in a transparent way by the government. Showing the costs of 
intervention - ultimately a claim on the taxpayer - in the budget would promote such transparency and 
facilitate parliamentary scrutiny. India’s recent approach illustrates this point well. Under the newly 
introduced monetary stabilisation scheme the central government is committed to issue bonds up to a 
fixed amount (initially INR 600 billion but increased subsequently to INR 800 billion) and keep the 
proceeds as a non-interest bearing special deposit with the RBI. The entire servicing cost will appear 
in the government’s budget. Such an arrangement ensures that the government’s additional debt is 
fully backed by a cash deposit for redeeming these market liabilities - making clear that net debt has 
not risen. At the same time, it shifts part of the financial burden of intervention to the government in a 
very transparent way, subjecting such financing to parliamentary review.
25 
                                                       
24  The memorandum submitted by the Reserve Bank of New Zealand to the Minister of Finance in March 2004 outlines the 
total financial requirement for implementing intervention. It includes NZD 1.9 billion to increase the Bank’s total stock of 
foreign currency reserve and up to NZD 1.0 billion as additional capital base; see RBNZ (2004). 
25  See RBI (2004b) and Kapur (2004) for the details about the MSS scheme. BIS Papers No 24  73
 
A further argument for issuance of government rather than central bank securities has a financial 
market angle. To the extent that local bond markets in emerging economies continue to be relatively 
illiquid, issuing large amounts of central bank securities could fragment the market, further reducing 
liquidity. Moreover, such a strategy might force market players to differentiate credit ratings of two 
sovereign entities, giving rise to significant distortions in their yields. Table 6, for instance, compares 
the monthly average yields on government and central bank securities of similar duration during 
January-August 2004 for three countries. Yield differences in basis points continue to be significant in 
some cases. Such differences might reflect several factors, such as the relative benchmark status of 
two types of securities, their differential tax treatments and even their different investor base. 
Nevertheless, such differences also imply that impacts of consolidating both issues on bond market 
liquidity can be substantial in some countries. 
 
Table 6 
Yields on government and central bank securities
1 
Chile Malaysia   
Government
2 Central  bank
3 Government
4 Central  bank
5 
Jan 04  4.86  4.90  2.66  2.73 
Feb 04  4.59  4.61  2.38  2.34 
Mar 04  4.32  4.36  2.48  2.48 
Apr 04  4.60  4.56  2.41  2.37 
May 04  4.63  4.57  2.48  2.53 
Jun 04  4.60  4.61  2.54  2.55 
Jul 04  4.46  4.45  2.39  2.36 
Aug 04  4.06  4.05     
1  Monthly  averages.   
2  Twenty-year  treasury  bonds.   
3  Twenty-year  central  bank  bonds.   
4    Average of midpoints of 
monthly ranges of three-month and six-month treasury bills.   
5  Average of midpoints of monthly ranges of three-month and 
six-month central bank bills. 
One suggestion has been that the central bank and government might issue securities of different 
maturities, reducing the problem of multiple yield curves. Korea has adopted such a strategy. The 
Bank of Korea’s monetary stabilisation bond commonly stretches out to three years whereas the 
government has issued primarily long term securities. Another suggestion proposed by McCauley (2003) 
is that the government might supply the required securities to the central bank by overfunding its fiscal 
operations and depositing the cash with the central bank. This is in effect the approach taken in India, 
albeit for somewhat different reasons. 
Capital account measures 
Another response to upward pressure on the currency has been to relax capital account restrictions.
26 
During the early 1990s capital inflows episode, many Latin American and Asian countries (notably 
Mexico, Brazil, Malaysia, Chile and Korea) eased restrictions on capital outflows. In the current cycle, 
the authorities in China have announced several measures to encourage outflows. These have 
included: relaxing residents’ overseas travel restrictions; promoting a qualified domestic investor 
scheme for encouraging outward portfolio investment; allowing domestic firms to issue foreign 
currency denominated bonds in the local market; and increasing the limit on firms’ direct investment 
                                                       
26  There is, nevertheless, some evidence to show that liberalising capital outflows may not succeed in reducing net inflows, 
especially if such liberalisation boosts the confidence of international investors, leading to more inflows; see Labán and 
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abroad. India has announced a comprehensive set of measures that aim to promote outward portfolio 
investment by residents, and encourage companies to prepay their external debt. Many countries 
(eg  India and Thailand) have reduced their official sector debt by prepaying loans to international 
creditors. 
In some cases, such outflow liberalisation has gone hand in hand with continuing or even new 
restrictions on inflows. Last year the authorities in Thailand restricted non-resident baht deposits in the 
banking system to counter appreciation pressures. Limitations were also placed on domestic financial 
institutions’ capacity to lend to non-residents. In others, such restrictions apply to non-resident 
investment in the domestic bond market either prohibiting certain types of investors (eg India) or 
placing a minimum holding period for their investments (eg Colombia and Poland).  
Whether such restrictions provide effective protection against speculative inflows remains an open 
question. The recent growth of non-deliverable forward markets in many Asian currencies is one 
demonstration of how such controls can be evaded. The paper by Rhee for this meeting shows the 
challenges faced by the Korean authorities from the offshore NDF markets on the won. A sharp rise in 
NDF transactions between the onshore banks and non-residents during the past four years has 
exaggerated won/dollar exchange rate volatility - non-residents buying (selling) dollars results in dollar 
short (long) positions of onshore banks in the spot market causing the won to depreciate (appreciate). 
To prevent such volatility the authorities in Korea imposed restrictions on the onshore entities’ lending 
and borrowing activities with offshore participants in the NDF market in January 2004. With the 
exchange rate stabilising the restrictions have been partly reversed in recent months. Moreover, as the 
experience of Singapore demonstrates, such restrictions are not without costs - they tend to reduce 
the depth of domestic financial markets; in particular, they may prevent the authorities’ attempts to 
develop a domestic bond market. For these reasons, the Monetary Authority of Singapore has recently 
substantially eased such restrictions. 
5. Conclusion 
The recent episode of prolonged, substantial intervention is not yet over. It is unclear how far the 
levels of foreign exchange reserves now held by some monetary authorities represent a 
quasi-permanent shift in desired holdings. If not, then at some point in the future such monetary 
authorities will presumably seek to intervene in the opposite direction. But by how much and how fast 
cannot be predicted. Nor can the consequences of such a reversal be foreseen. But it does seem 
unlikely that the circumstances prevailing over the past five years, which have been so favourable to 
intervention - notably low inflation and financial markets’ acquiescence in large current account 
imbalances - will last for ever. The policy dilemmas associated with conventional wisdom would then 




Capital flows and intervention
1 
Net capital flows  Current account 
balance 
























2    46   119  350  28    –18   354    18    47  649 
China    35    79   234    20    9   189    –7    5   398 
India   20   16   63    –18    –12    8    9    3   69 
Korea   20   41   37    –14    –32   58    5  32   71 
Taiwan   –29   –17    16    39    17    99    11    7   111 
Asia, other
2   81   70    –206    –32    –40    285  75    16   88 
Hong  Kong  SAR        –55   26   –8    46   18   –3    7 
Indonesia     22   21    –17    –12    –14   32    4    6    8 
Malaysia          –16    –10    –13   48    17    5   26 
Philippines     11   17    –15    –8    –6   18    4    2   –1 
Singapore    7   –9    –77    29  106    21    4   37 
Thailand   41   41    –26    –28    –28   35    11    3   11 
Latin America
2  128  100    77   –86   –64    –67    57   –10    44 
Argentina   22   17    –52    –10    –12    6    9    2    2 
Brazil      3   63   46    1    –41    –42    23    –8   14 
Chile     7   8   2    –4    –4    –2    4    –2   1 
Colombia     7   7      –5    –4    3    –1   2 
Mexico   94    3   94    –70    –4    –64    15    3   17 
Peru   1   8   7    –7    –8    –5    2    –1   2 
Venezuela     –5    –26    4    11   44    0    –2    7 
Eastern Europe
2   –3   23   85    –6    –13    –74    9    11   24 
Czech  Republic    3   12   29    0    –6    –20      3   12 
Hungary   7   5    23    –3    –3    –26    6    1   2 
Poland   –14      33    –3    –4   –28    –0    8    10 
Algeria    –2      4      1    –1    25 
Israel   2   9    –3    –4    –10    –5    0    2   3 
New  Zealand    6    8    11   –4   –7    –13   –1   –0    1 
Russia     –26   –45      0    0      –5    59 
Saudi  Arabia   57   12    –59    –67    –5   65      –1    8 
South  Africa   –3    7   13    8    –4   –5    0    –1    5 
Turkey       14   10   15    –10    –5    –27    0    1   16 
1  In billions of US dollars.   
2  Sum of the countries shown.   
3  Up to September 2004. 
Sources: IMF. 
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Table A2 
Foreign reserves net of currency in circulation 
  As a % of M1  As a % of M2  As a % of domestic 
credit to the private 
sector 
  1990 2004 1990 2004 1990 2004 
Asia,  large   –1.9   99.7   –3.5   11.2    –4.3    16.8 
China    –26.0   20.2   –12.4   7.7   –11.2    10.2 
India      –47.5    40.4    –16.7   11.4   –28.2    22.2 
Korea      23.9    324.0    2.6   21.0   3.7    27.3 
Taiwan   41.8   14.2    12.6   4.5   18.7    7.3 
Asia, other    96.1  192.8    17.6   34.9   20.8    48.5 
Hong Kong SAR        213.5    7.1    18.7    9.0    38.2 
Indonesia   37.2   99.2    10.4   24.0   9.0    47.2 
Malaysia      62.3    167.7   18.9   38.5    19.1    41.3 
Philippines      –4.6    140.3   –1.2   27.8    –2.1    50.7 
Singapore   271.4   386.8    55.8   78.9   74.2    87.2 
Thailand     114.2   149.1    14.6   21.3   15.8    26.1 
Latin America
   116.7   116.9    42.3    40.2   61.1   68.6 
Argentina     60.5   54.4    23.4   20.5   17.3    60.5 
Brazil      34.7    104.2    11.2   25.0   8.9    23.7 
Chile      276.8    177.0    83.1   39.5   46.5    25.5 
Colombia      89.5    96.5   48.8   31.4    60.4    44.1 
Mexico      13.4    71.4    2.1   12.3   4.9    39.6 
Peru      91.5    154.2    49.2   53.7   147.7    77.9 
Venezuela    250.5    160.3  78.5    99.2   142.1   208.9 
Central  Europe     48.1     21.2     34.0 
Czech  Republic     44.4     25.1     52.4 
Hungary   –13.4    38.7      14.4   –7.1   14.8 
Poland   8.3   61.3     24.2   6.6   34.9 
Algeria    –46.2   92.5   –36.4   51.0   –50.5    287.2 
Israel     144.1   213.4    13.6   19.3   16.6    20.7 
New  Zealand   70.9   32.9    10.6   5.4   10.7    4.1 
Russia     62.4     32.4     42.7 
Saudi Arabia    164.2    93.7   89.2   50.6    256.4    80.9 
South Africa     –1.8    11.1    –0.7   5.8   –0.6    4.2 
Turkey      42.7    165.6   13.8   24.4    21.1    54.4 
Sources: IMF; national data. 
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Table A3 
Central bank securities outstanding
1 
  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
2 
Asia
3   77.4   83.8   79.0   92.1    102.2 
   Hong Kong SAR    50.4    49.5    47.7    41.1    43.2 
   Indonesia    0.0    0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
   Korea    235.1    241.0   221.9   258.9   297.7 
      Malaysia   20.5   73.7   89.6   86.7   50.1 
      Philippines   21.1   26.1   23.4   20.6   24.3 
      Thailand   0.0  0.0  0.0   19.1   24.5 
Latin America
3   78.8   93.0   38.0   29.9   26.0 
   Brazil    128.1  158.5   34.3   16.4    8.6 
      Chile   0.6  0.6  0.6  0.6  0.5 
      Mexico   60.6   61.7   62.4   47.6   49.9 
   Peru    6.0    7.4    6.0    16.5    24.0 
   Venezuela    0.0    0.0   14.5   70.7   52.5 
Central Europe
3   62.6   51.0   81.0   69.7   68.4 
   Czech Republic    61.0    77.6   269.1   250.8   241.5 
   Hungary    30.9    33.4    2.0    1.9    1.9 
      Poland   73.8   46.3   33.2   20.8   22.3 
Others
3    3.6   25.4   33.6   36.4   52.2 
   Israel    0.0    96.0   110.9   130.9   179.3 
   South Africa    4.8   1.7  7.6  4.6  9.5 
1  As a percentage of reserve money; end of period.   
2  Data pertains to various months as reported by the central banks up 
to November 2004.   
3  Weighted average of the economies listed based on 2000 GDP and PPP exchange rates. 
Sources: IMF; central banks. 
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Table A4 
Main instruments for sterilisation 
Monetary instruments  Fiscal policy 
 




No sterilisation   No sterilisation   No  Yes; 
(operations via 
commercial banks)  
India  TBs and government 
securities, liquidity 
adjustment facility 










Indonesia   Reserve 
requirements (not 
explicitly used for 
sterilisation) 
  
Korea  Monetary Stabilisation 
Bonds 
No No   
Malaysia  Mainly money market 









between CB and 
banks on a daily 
basis) 
Philippines  Repos, reverse repos 
and outright 
transactions in general 
Tiering structure of 
over night deposits 
with the CB 
No Yes 
(coordination with 
the government on 
an infrequent basis ) 
Thailand  Repos, FX swaps, CB 
securities 
No No  Yes 
(coordination with 
the government on 
an daily basis ) 
Brazil  Reverse repos 
(government bonds as 
collateral) 
No No   
Chile  CB’s own securities  No  No  Yes 
(monthly 
coordination 
between govt and 
the CB) 
Colombia  Government bonds  No  No  Yes 
(coordination with 
the government) 
Mexico  CB’s own securities 
(government bonds 
used in the past); long-
term deposits with CB 
Yes; 
special deposit 




Peru  CB’s own securities  No  No  No 
Czech 
Republic 




(not specific to 
sterilisation)  
No Yes 
(generally taken into 
account for 
monetary policy 
operations) BIS Papers No 24  79
 
Table A4 (cont) 
Main instruments for sterilisation 
Monetary instruments  Fiscal policy   
Market Non-market  Fiscal  stance  Government cash 
balances 
Hungary  Two-week and 
overnight deposit 
facilities 
   Yes 
(cooperation at the 
strategic level) 
Poland  CB securities (14 days 
maturity); deposit facility 
   Yes 
(very limited 
coordination with the 
government) 
Israel  One-year TBs  
(“Makam” government 
securities only issued 
for monetary policy 
purposes)  
Yes No  No 
New Zealand  TBs, government bond 
sales; repo and reverse 
repo of government 
securities 
No    
South Africa  CB securities; 
government bonds 
(outright & repos) 




flows managed to 
have a neutral 
liquidity impact)  
Turkey  Mainly reverse repos in 
government bonds; 
standing deposit 
facilities and deposit 
auctions 
No   Yes 
(but still limited 
coordination)  
Source: Central bank responses to BIS questionnaire. 80  BIS Papers No 24
 
References 
Archer, D (2004): Comments prompted by “Foreign exchange interventions under inflation targeting: 
the Czech experience” by Tomáš Holub, conference on practical experience with inflation targeting, 
Czech National Bank, Prague, May 13-14. 
Argy, V E (1994): International macroeconomics: theory and practice, Routledge, N Y. 
Argy, V E and G L Murray (1985): “Effects of sterilising a balance of payments surplus on domestic 
yields - a formal analysis”, Journal of international money and finance, 4, pp 223-36. 
Bank for International Settlements (2004), 74th Annual Report. 
Caballero, R J and A Krishnamurthy (2000): “International liquidity management: sterilization policy in 
illiquid financial markets”, NBER Working Papers, 7740, (June). 
Calvo, G A (1991): “The perils of sterilisation”, IMF Staff Papers, 38 (4), pp 921-26. 
Calvo, G A, L Leiderman and C M Reinhart (1993): “Capital inflows and real exchange rate 
appreciation in Latin America: the role of external factors”, IMF Staff Papers, 40 (1), pp 108-51. 
Elkayam, D (2004): “Exchange rate regimes, monetary policy and inflation in Israel since the 
stabilization program of 1985”, paper presented at the BIS workshop on exchange rates and monetary 
policy, 28-29 October, Bank for International Settlements. 
Frankel, J A (1993): “Sterilization of monetary inflows: difficult (Calvo) or easy (Reisen)?”, Working 
paper, no C93-024, University of California at Berkeley. 
Fry, M (1993): “Financial opening and monetary control in Pacific basin developing countries”, in 
Helmut Reisen and Bernard Fischer (eds), Financial opening: policy issues and experiences in 
developing countries, OECD, Paris. 
Griffith-Jones, S, M F Montes and A Nasution (2001): “Managing capital surges in emerging 
economies”, in Griffith-Jones, Montes and Nasution (eds), Short-term capital flows and economic 
crises, Oxford University Press. 
Holub, T (2004): “Foreign exchange intervention under inflation targeting: the Czech experience”, CNB 
internal research and policy note, Czech National Bank (January).  
Jurgensen, P (1983): Report of the working group on foreign exchange market intervention, 
US Treasury Department, Washington DC. 
Kapur, M (2004): Exchange rates and monetary policy: the Indian experience, paper presented at the 
BIS conference on exchange rate and monetary policy, 28-29 October, Bank for International 
Settlements. 
Kouri, P J K and M G Porter (1974): “International capital flows and portfolio equilibrium”, Journal of 
Political Economy (May/June) 82, pp 443-67. 
R Labán and F Larraín (1994): “What drives capital inflows? lessons from the recent Chilean 
experience”, Documento de Trabajo no 168, Instituto de Economia, Santiago. 
Ma, G and R N McCauley (2004): “Effectiveness of China’s capital controls: some empirical evidence”, 
(manuscript), Bank for International Settlements. 
McCauley, R N (2003): “Unifying government bond markets in East Asia”, BIS Quarterly Review 
(December), pp 89-98. 
Mohanty, M S and M Scatigna (2005): “Has globalisation reduced monetary policy independence?”, in 
Globalisation and monetary policy in emerging markets, BIS papers, no 23, May.  
Mundell, R A (1968): International economics (capital mobility and stabilisation policy under fixed and 
flexible exchange rates), Macmillan. 
Nasution, A (2001): “Capital inflows and policy responses: the case of Indonesia in the 1990s”, in 
Griffith-Jones, Montes and Nasution (eds), Short-term capital flows and economic crises, Oxford 
University Press. 
Reinhart, C M and S Dunaway (1996): “Dealing with capital inflows: are there any lessons?”, Research 
Action Series, 28, Helsinki: UNU/WIDER (September). BIS Papers No 24  81
 
Reinhart, C M and V Reinhart (1999): “Some lessons for policy makers who deal with the mixed 
blessing of capital inflows”, in M Kahler (eds), Capital flows and financial crises, pp 93-127. 
Reisen, H (1993): “Capital flows and their effect on the monetary base”, Cepal Review, 51 
(December), pp 113-22. 
Reserve Bank of India (2004a): Annual Report. 
——— (2004b): Report of the working group on instruments of sterilisation, RBI Bulletin (April). 
Reserve Bank of New Zealand (2004): Options for foreign exchange intervention, memorandum for 
Minister of Finance (1 March), www.rbnz.govt.nz. 
——— (2004): Background information on the Reserve Bank’s proposal to extend the purpose for 
which it holds foreign exchange reserves (17 March), www.rbnz.govt.nz. 
Tee, O C (2005): “Impact of globalisation on the formulation and implementation of monetary policy in 
Singapore”, in Globalisation and monetary policy in emerging markets, BIS papers, no 23, May.  
Truman, E M (2003): “The limits of exchange market intervention”, in C F Bergsten and J Williamson 
(eds), Dollar overvaluation and the world economy, Institute for International Economics, pp 247-65. 
Turner, P (1991): “Capital flows in the 1980s: a survey of major trends”, BIS Economic Papers, no 30. 
Velasco, A and P Cabezas (1999): “Alternative responses to capital inflows: a tale of two countries”, in 
M Kahler (ed), Capital flows and financial crises, pp 129-57. 
World Bank (1997): Private capital flows to developing countries: the road to financial integration, 
Oxford University Press.  
Xie, D (2004): “Macroeconomic policy coordination under managed floating exchange rate regime - 
China’s case”, paper presented at the BIS workshop on exchange rates and monetary policy,   
28-29 October, Bank for International Settlements. 
 